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Conclusion
Stability in revolution
The right of revolution is the obverse of the duty of obedience; 
the explanation of revolution the obverse of the explanation of 
stability.'
Repeated mass violence directed against the institutions and personnel 
of the established church, armed insurrection designed to topple the 
existing government, experiments with new political and religious forms 
- all this and much more suggests that the Dutch Revolt lends itself well 
to analysis informed by the scholarship on collective action. To be sure, 
this literature was developed to explain change by investigation of the 
behavior of determinate groups in pursuit of common goals. But for the 
reasons alluded to in Freeman’s observation just quoted, it can also help 
the student of stability account for the weakness or absence of such 
behavior. What follows draws upon this body of concepts, first to identify 
the critical factors inhibiting collective action in Lille, and then to spec­
ify the conditions that fostered it in other cities.^
Before examining the various urban histories, it will be useful to 
define and briefly outline the elements in collective action analysis rele­
vant to this study. Common interests are the basis on which groups form to 
take action. They may be oriented either toward gaining new benefits or 
toward defending long-accepted rights and privileges. Organization is 
the process of increasing the common identity - the consciousness -
> Michael Freeman, “Review Article: Theories of Revolution,” British Journal of Political Science 2
(i972):339.
2 I have found most helpful Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, and Rod Aya, “Theories of 
Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence,” Theory and Society 8 
(i979):i-38.
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and unifying structure among members of a group so it can act on its 
interests. Through mobilization, a group comes to control resources that 
will enable it to implement its members’ common interests. Opportunities 
or threats are perceptions by groups that encourage or impel them to act, 
whereas facilitation and repression, measures taken by those in power, 
contribute to or prevent groups from acting.
Social relations arising from economic pursuits often create common 
interests, consciousness, and structures. But scholars of collective action 
argue that interest groups also form on the basis of religion, politics, 
residence - anything, in short, that generates both a shared situation 
perceived as such by its protagonists and a shared understanding of 
rights and responsibilities that mandate action. Thus collective action is 
frequendy - and most successfully - undertaken not by single groups 
but by coalitions. In these alliances, the links among groups powerfully 
affect the ways in which common interests are construed and articulated, 
the forms of organization devised, the possibilities for mobilizing, and 
the environment in which any undertaking occurs.
Fissures within the existing government are crucial for the develop­
ment of all components of collective action. Splits of this sort can, in 
particular, lead to alliances between contenders and a faction of the 
government; they can make the authorities unwilling or unable to use 
sufficient force to crush challenges; or they can be accompanied by the . 
breakdown of normal forms of legitimation. Any manner of specific 
issue can provoke such breaches. But they are often grounded in social 
and economic change, and this at the same time tends to weaken the 
controls that help preserve the existing order in normal times. Finally, 
collective action is not, according to most scholars, predicated upon the 
existence of conscious revolutionary groups pursuing new or expanded 
interests. On the contrary, an intent to implement forward-looking radi­
cal change is rarely present at, nor is it necessary for, the outbreak of 
revolt. Much more common are conservative, reactive, defensive move­
ments. Typically, they aim to protect existing interests against changes 
caused or condoned by the political authorities.
I
The policing measures taken by successive Magistrats and governors in 
response to immediate crises have understandably loomed large in Part
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Two, where the atypicality and weakness of viable collective action has 
been a dominant theme of the analysis. These steps were successful in 
stabilizing Lille during the revolt, however, only because of arrange­
ments - examined in Part One - that had been instituted over the 
previous decades and elaborated as needed thereafter. Begun piecemeal 
in response to currently pressing needs and demands, over time these 
arrangements came to constitute the crucial elements of a social and 
political order that served to dampen rather than promote disruption 
and rebellion. They did not, of course, predetermine the city’s behavior, 
but they endowed Lille with a structural tendency to stability. Not only 
was there little pressure for religious or political change, but movements 
that did emerge lacked effective means for realizing their objectives. In 
particular, artisans and Protestants, who mounted significant challenges 
in other cities, were denied the resources needed to play a similar role in 
Lille.
Small commodity production and the municipal welfare system were 
of central importance to Lille’s stability. Taken together, they channeled 
the growth of the light-textile industry to the advantage of a large group 
of petty masters with a firm stake in the developing social and economic 
structure. They also curbed the potentially destabilizing emergence of 
either a polarized class structure or intractable material grievances. Be­
cause, moreover, the municipal ruling class dominated corporate and 
charitable institutions and repeatedly intervened in the urban social 
economy, artisan interests were shaped by and mediated through the 
political elite. Hence ideas and practices that questioned the existing 
order not only lacked a viable social base but faced the hostility of both 
the great majority of artisans and the ruling group. Innovation could 
therefore be stigmatized as economically unjustified, socially disruptive, 
and morally indefensible.
At the same time that the structures of Lille’s economy hindered the 
growth of an oppositional identity among urban masters, they also di­
vided key groups of artisans in the city from their counterparts in the 
countryside. The social and economic experiences of textile artisans in 
Lille differed sharply from those of their counterparts in villages. 
Whereas urban weavers operated within the small commodity system, 
rural producers were much more likely to be dependent wage earners, 
typically employed in some sort of putting-out arrangement. In addition, 
a shared antagonism toward the development of rural textiles bound
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together ruling class and artisans in the city. The large body of urban 
weavers in particular objected to the emergence of competition in the 
countryside. After all, they benefited from the existing asymmetrical 
regional division of labor that assigned less remunerative preparatory 
work to rural areas, while reserving more lucrative jobs to the city. Not 
surprisingly, then, the urban monopolies that underlay this unequal dis­
tribution of tasks joined the interests of Magistrat and craftsman.
Besides foreclosing the emergence of autonomous artisan con­
sciousness, organization, and mobilization within Lille and on a regional 
basis, small commodity production and the Common Fund also re­
stricted the urban audience for Protestantism. They perpetuated viable 
corporate and civic institutions and ideology on the one hand, and they 
minimized change and hardship on the other. To be sure, an organized 
Reformed community did arise in sixteenth-century Lille, and local 
threats combined with opportunities created by national and regional 
incidents to stimulate some mobilization. But Lille’s Protestants were 
unable to profit even when a broad political, religious, social, and eco­
nomic crisis enveloped the Netherlands. Once their merchant element 
withdrew or fell silent, the Reformed were cut off from any access to 
urban political resources that might have eased the repression visited 
upon them.
Finally, Lille’s social and economic structures discouraged rural and 
urban dissenters from forging strong common interests and viable coali­
tions. As it evolved, of course, the Protestant movement emphasized 
cooperation among fellow believers no matter where their place of resi­
dence. What is more. Reformed religion took root most firmly in the 
rural cloth communities of northern Walloon Flanders. Yet the continu­
ing development of small commodity relations of production and welfare 
services meant that the life experiences of most Lillois remained conso­
nant with the beliefs and practices of the traditional faith. So during the 
summer of 1566, when Reformers were pulling down the symbols of the 
old church and raising the new throughout Walloon Flanders, “the 
common people” {la commune) of Lille were “very agitated” about re­
ligion, the Magistrat reported.^ But their activities were designed to stop 
heretics, not assist them.
3 Response to Toumai’s Protestants, printed in Verheyden, “Chronique de Gaiffier,” pp. 81-2.
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Over the long term, sustained economic- growth provided a favorable 
environment for stability. As we have Seen, however, it was the magis­
trates who enacted the arrangements that hobbled the emergence and 
mobilization of contending groups and then uniformly and effectively 
crushed any that managed to appear. There were a number of reasons 
why Lille’s ruling class was able to intervene decisively over many tu­
multuous decades and indeed to redouble its efforts as the economic 
cycle became more erratic, inflation more pressing, and Protestant agi­
tation more extensive after midcentury. To begin with, the city’s political 
and economic elites overlapped considerably, the result of homogeneous 
social composition enhanced by intermarriage and dense networks of 
business relationships. The cohesion of the magistracy was further 
strengthened by rotation in office and the constitution of an informal 
inner circle, both of which encouraged unity founded on a community of 
interests as well as long acquaintanceship. In addition, the formation of 
factions that might have entered alliances with challengers from outside 
the government was discouraged by the absence of an entrenched pa­
triciate and the consequent newness of the ruling class. Like the mer­
chant class that provided the bulk of its members, Lille’s governing 
group remained open to those who acquired the proper social and eco­
nomic credentials. At the same time, the frustration of artisan en­
trepreneurial efforts removed the possibility that a wealthy and strategic 
group might emerge to contest not merely specific policies but the entire 
distribution of political power that bred them.
Conversely, the lack of corporate participation in city government 
meant that artisans had no political space of their own in which they 
might have formulated and enunciated demands distinct from, and per­
haps in conflict with, those of the governing elite. Thus when direct 
challenges to the Magistrat were voiced in the late 1570s, they evoked 
no response within this solidary ruling class or for that matter among any 
other organized group of townspeople, save, on one occasion, some 
militia officers. In this instance, moreover, the fact that the municipal 
government rather than guilds or some other body controlled the civic 
companies allowed the authorities to nip the protest in the bud and 
regain the initiative. So lacking any politically significant resources - 
such as divisions among the authorities, allies for a coalition, or armed 
force - the contenders were quickly isolated and defeated. Even the
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Estates-General, to whom the insurgents appealed for aid, quickly rec­
ognized that the balance of power overwhelmingly favored the estab­
lished authorities.
The municipal government could also act effectively because its 
members remained closely attuned to urban society. On the one hand, 
very few of the merchants who dominated the Magistrat abandoned 
trade. On the other, aldermen and councillors - many of them drawn 
from the inner circle of the ruling class - sat on the bodies administering 
the textile crafts and the Bourse commune, where they learned at first 
hand about important issues. Probably it was this experience that made a 
merchant-controlled municipal government willing not merely to coun­
tenance but to construct and enforce small commodity production, sac­
rificing probable economic gain for social and political purposes. In 
turn, successful measures legitimated the Magistrat’s rule while extend­
ing its control.
The same features that promoted the Loi’s cohesion and secured its 
local hegemony likewise permitted it to retain a substantial degree of 
autonomy from successive central governments. The Magistrat was not 
a policy innovator and indeed usually sought to work with the regime in 
power, particularly in order to secure or extend economic and jurisdic­
tional benefits. At the same time, however, it is clear that Lille’s magis­
trates were consistently and firmly resolved to defend municipal privi­
leges, the established faith, and their own authority, and would resist 
central-state measures that threatened any of these. These commit­
ments explain not only their stubborn resistance to confiscation and 
rejection of the Tenth and Twentieth Pennies, but also their eventual 
break with the Estates-General.
On occasion, of course, the Magistrat did face challenges, whether 
from would-be entrepreneurs, Protestants, or Zealots. But in conse­
quence of arrangements implemented largely by the ruling class, con­
tenders never managed to assemble the resources needed to mobilize 
successfully and capitalize on dissidence. Only intervention from the 
outside promised any real breakthrough for the proponents of collective 
action for change in sixteenth-century Lille. Yet in the absence of any 
viable popular movement within the city, such attempts were doomed to 
rapid failure. In fact, as the popular vigilantism of summer 1566 inti­
mated, and the crowds that greeted insurgent initiatives in 1578 strik­
ingly demonstrated, it was the ruling class, not a rebellion, Aat could
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summon citizens into the streets and squares of Lille to enforce its 
program.
II
Lille’s magistrates were scarcely the only ones who actively sought the 
stability that would preserve their rule and what they construed as their 
city’s best interests. But to judge by the available studies - which to be 
sure have focused on towns where some sort of significant collective 
action did occur - the environment accounting for Lille’s situation was 
rarely matched. The scholarly literature reveals the existence of two 
groups of towns, which may be called revolutionary centers and coup 
cities. Each exhibited a different pattern of interaction among material 
conditions, social and economic structure, religious ferment, political 
institutions, and magisterial conduct, and each was subject to distinct 
forms of mobilization for collective action.
Revolutionary centers lay mainly in the southern provinces of the 
Netherlands. Here broadly based, prolonged collective action effected 
political and/or religibus change for a significant period of time, though 
never permanently Among these centers were to be found the major 
light-cloth towns - apart from Lille. But it was the great cities of Bra­
bant, notably Antwerp and Brussels, as well as Ghent in Flanders, that 
saw the most sustained and far-reaching revolutionary developments."^ 
With the partial exception of Ghent, these towns underwent rapid 
economic growth across the early sixteenth century. In all of them, too, 
the long period of expansion terminated soon after midcentury in a 
decade or more of stagnation ending in harsh crises. But if their eco­
nomic and material histories resembled Lille’s in these respects, the 
absence of viable protective structures or adequate ameliorative and 
regulative institutions crucially distinguished them. Ghent was further
^ The following draws on Hocquet, Toumai et le Toumaisis au XVIe siecle; Paul Rolland, Histoire de 
Toumai (Tournai and Paris, 1957); Histoire de Valenciennes, ed. Henri Platelle (Lille, 1982); Clark, 
“An Urban Study during the Revolt of the Netherlands”; Van der Wee, Rise ofthe Antwerp Market; 
Idem, “The Economy as a Factor in the Start of the Antwerpen in deXVIde eeuw; Hugo
Soly, “Nijverheid en kapitalisme te Antwerpen in de i6de eeuw,” in Album Charles Verlinden 
(Ghent, 1975); idem, “Economische vernieuwing en sociale weerstand. De betekenis en aspi- 
raties der Antwerpse middenklasse in de i6de eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 83 (1970)1520- 
35; idem, Urbanisme en Kapitalisme te Antwerpen in de 16de eeuw (Brussels, 1977); Histoire de 
Bruxelles, ed. Mina Martens (Toulouse, 1979); Alexandre Henne and Alphonse Wauters, Histoire 
de Bruxelles, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1845); Hans Van Werveke, Gand, esquisse d’histoire sociale (Brussels, 
1946); Victor Fris, Histoire de Gand, 2nd ed. (Brussels, 1930).
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set apart by a combination of commercial growth - principally in grain 
and linens - and industrial decline, strikingly evident in woolen drapery. 
But in the social results of economic development, Ghent did resemble 
the other revolutionary centers. A substantial middling artisanry sud­
denly faced the end of its accustomed prosperity in the 1560s, while 
impoverished wage earners became increasingly desperate. To be sure, 
even in new and less regulated crafts most enterprises were small, and 
even in Antwerp there is some evidence of support for masters’ demands 
for safeguards against innovators.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the traditional social and economic 
order was under attack. Particularly disturbing to those threatened hy 
such developments, the magistracies typically failed to act or even took 
the capitalists’ side. Complaints against entrepreneurs and authorities 
alike began to stir artisans - already in 1554, riots in Antwerp revealed 
deep dissatisfaction - and led them to countenance joint action with the 
wage earners they normally despised.^
These processes of change and the grievances to which they gave rise 
had the added result of making artisans and wage earners more receptive 
to Protestantism, especially when religious dissenters offered charity that 
municipalities were unable or unwilling to extend. The groupings thus 
formed also found indispensable coalition partners among political con­
tenders. The magistracies that held sway over these cities were closed 
oligarchies consisting largely of rentiers, nobles, and professionals - a 
social composition that may explain their unimaginative responses to 
artisan concerns. What is more, the ruling strata were widely, if not always 
accurately, perceived as doing the bidding of the central government to 
the detriment of municipal privileges and finances.
Among those challenging the city governments were groups excluded 
from decision making yet at the same time enjoying access to significant 
institutional and coercive resources that fostered mobilization while 
helping parry repression. In Brussels, for instance, both the patrician 
lignages and the guild and citizen elite, grouped into nations, had had
5 Cf. the situation in the great West Flanders say-cloth center of Hondschoote. After coming to 
dominate local government, from about 1540 merchant entrepreneurs were allowed both to 
ignore previously enforced limits on loom ownership and to move in the direction of vertical 
concentration by taking over several stages of production. All this helped generate animosity that 
contributed to broad participation in iconoclastic riots. See Emile Coomaert, Un centre industriel 
d'autrefois. La draperie-sayetterie d’Hondschoote (XlVe-XVIIIe siecles) (Rennes, 1930).
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their authority curbed by princely officials while nonetheless remaining 
part of municipal government. The guilds at Antwerp, which had be­
come increasingly conscious of their rising economic importance, were 
strongly represented on the supervisory Broad and Monday Councils. 
The Conseil particulier oiSdXtncitnnts, established in 1497 in response 
to merchant complaints about the corruption of the Magistrat, con­
ducted biweekly reviews of the aldermen’s activities, and it controlled 
the civic militia. Named in principle by the sovereign, in practice the 
members of the council were coopted and served repeatedly, endowing 
the body with a great deal of unity and solidarity. At Tournai, the ban- 
nieres (organizations that included every guild as well as all other cit­
izens), and at Ghent the “members” (three bodies dominated by guilds, 
in particular the drap weavers) had within recent memory lost power to 
paid oligarchies of the rich, appointed and closely supervised by the 
central government. The corporate groups continued, however, to have 
charge of the militia.
Under these conditions, central-government policies - preeminently 
though not exclusively the persecution of Protestants - not only failed 
utterly but laid bare fissures within the local political order that were 
quickly exploited by insurgents. Common interests - largely defensive 
though also, in the case of religious reformers, innovative in nature - 
thus engendered organized groups that allied into mobilized coalitions. 
Armed with strategic ideological, social, and material resources, these 
alliances responded forcefully to threats and took full advantage of the 
distinctive opportunities arising in each city. At the same time, however, 
significant differences in constituency, goals, and resources existed 
among the various partners in these coalitions. Over time, these diver­
gences generated a process of radicalization, as each group attempted to 
dominate the new regime. But they ended in internecine strife, mutual 
exhaustion, and acceptance of Spanish rule, whether achieved by mili­
tary defeat or by negotiation.
In coup cities, collective action to effect religious and/or political 
change occurred but was less broadly based and intense than in the 
revolutionary centers. Thus success came only with aid from outside. 
Coups occurred principally during the second phase of revolt, when 
Beggar assaults with the assistance of accomplices within took over 
towns, most durably in Holland and Zeeland. But they also took place
315
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during the period of Estates-General rule, when exiled Protestants and 
partisans of William of Orange patronized or provoked risings that they 
then helped to carry through.^
Most cities that underwent coups were experiencing economic de­
cline, considerably sharpened in the period just preceding the risings, 
and this process caused bitter social tensions. Admittedly, in some towns 
attempts had been made to establish new industries (Ypres, for example, 
tried says and other light cloth), but most of these efforts had miscarried. 
At Bruges, a recently created fustian industry initially met with success, 
but after midcentury its output was characterized by substantial oscilla­
tions superimposed on a stagnant or even downward trend. In order to 
stimulate economic growth, moreover, urban authorities usually dis­
mantled existing regulations that protected small producers or, as at 
Douai, vacillated so much that in the end they managed to satisfy neither 
masters nor entrepreneurs. Worse, none of the towns had adequate 
welfare systems to cope with widespread downward mobility and im­
poverishment. Clerical or corporate opposition derailed projects similar 
to Lille’s Common Fund in several cities; continued economic decay 
bankrupted reforms that had been implemented elsewhere. The result­
ing misery provided Orangists and Protestants with a constituency and 
an issue that they were not slow to exploit.
Exclusive, ingrown oligarchies, city magistracies were also perceived 
as all too accommodating to central government pressures - notably, in 
Holland and Zeeland at least, in regard to Alba’s taxes - even though
* The following discussion is based on J. C. Boogman, “De overgang van Gouda, Dordrecht, 
Leiden en Delft in de zomer van het jaar 1572,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 57 (i942):8i-ii2; T. 
S. Jansma, “De betekenis van Dordrecht en Rotterdam omstreeks het midden der zestiende 
eeuw,” De Economist 92 (i943);2i2-5o; N. W. Posthumus, Geschiedenis van de Leidsche Lakenin- 
dustrie, 2 vols. in 3 parts (The Hague, 1908-39); P. J. Blok, Geschiedenis eener Hollandsche Stad, 4 
vols. (The Hague, 1910-18) [on Leiden]; C. C. Hibben, Gouda in Revolt. Particularism and 
Pacifism in the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572-1588 (Uxxtcht, 1983); DuPlessis, “Urban Stability in 
the Netherlands Revolution” [on Douai]; J. A. Van Houtte, Bruges. Essai d’histoire urbaine 
(Brussels, 1967); \Aem, De geschiedenis van Brugge fEitXt, 1982); J. Vermaut, “Structural Transfor­
mation in a Textile Centre: Bruges from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” in The Rise 
and Decline of Urban Industries in Italy and in the Low Countries (Late Middle Ages - Early Modem 
Times), ed. Herman Van der Wee (Leuven, 1988), pp. 187-205; J. De Mey, “De ‘mislukte’ 
anapassingen van de nieuwe draperie, de saainijverheid en de lichte draperie te leper,” Tijdschrift 
voor geschiedenis 63 (i9So);222-35; Raymond Van Uytven, Stadsfinancien en Stadsekonomie te 
Leuven van deXIIe tot het einde derXVIe eeuw (Brussels, 1961); OSexmam, Arbeid en Levensstan- 
daard; Rudolf Kolman, De Reductie van Nijmegen (1591), voor- en naspel (Groningen, 1952); 
Pirenne, ’s-Hertogenbosch; Decavele, Dageractd van de Reformatie. Cf. A. J. M. Beenakker, Breda in 
de eerste storm van de opstand. Van Ketterij tot beeldenstorm 1545-1569 (Tilburg, 1971).
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they tended to drag their feet on the issue of persecuting heretics. 
Corporations had no institutional presence in Holland and Zeeland 
municipalities, although elsewhere they had some voice in town affairs. 
But no matter what the reigning institutional arrangements, militias 
were generally independent of the town government, even when not 
under guild control, and they drew their membership largely from ar­
tisans. Additionally, the civic companies began to take a keener interest 
in their traditional role as guarantors of urban privileges now that mag­
istracies were perceived to be laggard in this regard.
In coup towns, then, opposition groups had urgent dissatisfactions, 
and resources existed that would facilitate collective action. But both 
individually and even in coalition the contenders were too small in 
number and too divided in interests to win on their own. Because many 
artisans in these towns produced for local and regional markets, social 
and economic change affected or threatened only a minority. Even in the 
luxury drapery trades in the Flemish cities, in fact, corporations had 
retained most of their traditional religious and social attributes as well as 
protective rules, so new ideas and practices had made few inroads 
among the artisans.
Hence outside aid was essential for challengers to prevail. It might 
come from Beggars and exiles, as in Holland and Zeeland, from Ghent 
Calvinists and revolutionaries, as in Flanders, or from the troops of the 
Estates-General, as in Brabant. Hence, too, radical political experi­
ments did not follow coups. Admittedly, many individual magistrates 
were purged on grounds of religion or hostility to Orangism, but neither 
the social composition nor the structure of the municipal regimes was 
altered. It was the weaknesses of the city governments, and their reliance 
on external support, that made successful coups possible; it was the 
weaknesses of contenders, and their reliance on external force, that 
limited the coups’ effects. Even in the northern towns, where a new state 
and religious order were introduced, the dominant groups perpetuated 
their hegemony by exchanging Habsburg for Orangist tutelage.
Amsterdam formed something of an exception to other coup centers 
in that it had experienced rapid economic growth during the first two- 
thirds of the sixteenth century.^ Yet the results of its development re-
’  See A. J. M. Brouwer Ancher and Joh. C. Breen, “De Doleantie van een deel der burgerij van 
Amsterdam tegen den Magistraat dier stad in 1564 en 1565,” Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het 
Historisch Genootschap 24 (1902) 15 9-200; H. Brugmans, Opkomst en Bloei van Amsterdam (Amster-
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sembled those prevailing in the other towns in which coups took place. 
On the one side, traditional artisan crafts organized in guilds subordi­
nate to and excluded from the city government remained dominant; on 
the other, harbingers of structural change were beginning to appear in 
some industrial sectors. In addition, during the 1560s opposition to the 
long-entrenched, resolutely Catholic “Dirkist” oligarchy emerged in the 
form of the “Doleanten” party. Resentful of their exclusion from the 
seats of municipal power despite possessing comparable if not greater 
wealth than the incumbents, the Doleanten also suspected the Dirkists 
of failing adequately to protect the vitally important grain trade. Further, 
the Doleanten found the current magistracy too subservient to Brussels’s 
dictates on religious matters and insufficiently heedful of municipal 
privileges.
To be sure, despite serious iconoclasm in 1566, and a near-revolt by 
several thousand townspeople early the next year, the insurgent move­
ment lacked sufficient common interests to prevail at the time. But a 
decade of severe depression, which the Dirkists failed to manage satis­
factorily, corroded loyalties to the point that the citizen militia refused to 
defend the government during its final climacteric. Even then, however, 
Amsterdam’s old regime retained substantial human, ideological, and 
repressive resources, and it was only overthrown in 1578 thanks to 
assistance provided by returning exiles.
Ill
Although well aware of the defensive aspects of the Dutch Revolt, Henri 
Pirenne presented it as essentially progressive in nature, the clash of 
protagonists pursuing forward-looking interests. He depicted a royal 
government bent on centralizing and unifying a nation; capitalist classes 
driven to overcome their alienation from the existing order through 
political, social, religious, and ideological innovation; and a bold new 
faith willing to employ novel forms of organization and discipline to 
break sharply with established belief and practice. Scholars of collective
dam, 1911); J. E. Elias, Geschiedenis van het Amsterdamse Regentenpatriciaat (The Hague, 1923);!. 
G. van Dillen, Amsterdam in 1585 (Amsterdam, 1941); Henk F. K. van Nierop, Beeldenstorm en 
burgerlijk verzet in Amsterdam 1566-1567 (Nijmegen, 1978); James D. Tracy, “A Premature 
Counter-Reformation; The Dirkist Government of Amsterdam, i ssS-i ^umal of Religious
History 13 (1984): 150-67.
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action, in contrast, maintain that much radical and even revolutionary 
action occurs in order to prevent change, not to promote it.
The evidence presented in this book indicates that it was the interac­
tion of both forward-looking and defensive forces that gave rise to the 
Dutch Revolt, at least in the cities. Some central government policies, 
most notably those directed toward building a more integrated state, 
were innovatory. Yet the Habsburgs - like their Protestant adversaries - 
clung stubbornly to the long-established belief that a single church must 
enjoy a religious monopoly in their domains. On their side, many munic­
ipal governments were devising new institutions or subordinating exist­
ing ones, thereby enhancing their control over urban populations. Al­
most without exception, however, they struggled to protect existing 
rights and privileges against Brussels’s religious and financial policies. 
Those that failed to do so faced a risky loss of legitimacy at home, if not 
rebellion or even overthrow.
Again, it was neither the frustrated expectations nor the absolute 
impoverishment of social classes newly generated by capitalist develop­
ment that alone gave strength to urban protest in the Netherlands. 
Rather, it was these in tandem with portents of structural change troub­
ling small and medium producers at a time when steep inflation, market 
instability, and insufficient ameliorative systems increased this pivotal 
group’s vulnerability to entrepreneurial initiatives. What mattered was 
less the presence of proletarians than the threat of proletarianization. 
Finally, Protestant demands for and steps toward the open exercise of 
their faith represented a break with rather than a continuation of the 
status quo. Yet if some people may have harkened to the new message 
because of unsettling changes in their work or social experiences, many 
others found the Reformed religion appealing because it expressed their 
fear of change. For their part, Protestants resembled not so much a mass 
movement - or even a disciplined revolutionary vanguard - as a hetero­
geneous alliance responding to a constantly shifting constellation of 
threats and opportunities. In and of themselves, the Reformed contrib­
uted to the outbreak of the revolt by exposing and exploiting weak points 
in the political system and its repressive apparatus. But to succeed in 
attaining their goals, even in part, Protestants had to form coalitions with 
groups with an essentially reactive orientation.
This book also maintains that it was a combination of defensive and 
forward-looking measures that permitted the achievement of stability in
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sixteenth-century Lille. Artisan mobilization was not inhibited because 
the city fathers acquiesced in extensive innovation or because they at­
tempted to maintain a static social order. Instead, it was blocked because 
the Magistrat had recourse to selective adaptation, psychological as well 
as material. More generally, this book claims that while powerful eco­
nomic, social, and religious currents created the potential for revolt in 
the mid-sixteenth-century Netherlands, it was the political response of 
the local ruling class that determined whether such an outcome would in 
fact be realized. As the example of Lille shows, even an oligarchic 
magistracy pursuing the repressive policy favored by an increasingly 
unpopular central government could stay firmly in control. What it had 
to do - and what few other urban governments apparently managed to 
accomplish - was at once resolutely to address the perceived sources of 
discontent and to tighten controls over the populace.
Lille’s ruling class did not make its history entirely, or even largely, 
under conditions of its own choosing. The city’s economic groAvth was - 
and this became painfully obvious during recurrent crises - dependent 
on conditions within a competitive international market over which its 
people, even its greatest merchants, had very little control. Similarly, the 
diffusion of religious dissent was a function of commercial routes, tech­
nological developments, and cultural evolution that the Magistrat could 
not interrupt. Even such favorable factors as electoral procedures or the 
recent formation of the urban political class were legacies that the Loi 
could turn to its benefit but had not created. What Lille’s political 
leadership must be credited with is the ability to recognize that it could 
reproduce both stability and its own hegemony through discriminating 
intervention, particularly in social and economic affairs, that balanced 
economic considerations with broadly based cultural traditions and 
ideological commitments.
In the literature on the Dutch Revolt - indeed, in the scholarship on 
revolution as a whole - Lille thus continues to stand out as singular, a 
stark contrast to the centers of iconoclasm, resistance, and rebellion that 
have understandably received most attention. But its example suggests 
the advisability of studying locations where mobilization was checked, 
insurgency contained, and collective action blocked, if we wish to under­
stand both revolution and its counterpart stability.
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